

# 8 SECURITY STRATEGIES FOR UNMANAGED DEVICES IN THE ENTERPRISE WEBINAR

*Featuring Jack Marsal, Sr. Director of Product Marketing, Armis  
and Michelle Drolet, Founder & CEO, Towerwall*

**Towerwall**  
Protecting Data Integrity

 **armis**

# Your Partner in Data Protection

For **over 25 years**, we have helped scores of companies **safeguard their data** and **leverage their investment in IT** with advanced information security solutions and services.



# Towerwall At-a-Glance



**Team  
led by**

**Michelle  
Drolet**

**110+**

**Years of  
Experience**

Our team has more than 110 years of combined experience protecting data integrity.

**100+**

**Companies  
Safeguarded**

We have helped hundreds of companies safeguard their data and leverage their investment in IT .



# 8 SECURITY STRATEGIES FOR UNMANAGED DEVICES IN THE ENTERPRISE

Jack Marsal  
Sr. Director of Product Marketing

# Unmanaged Devices = IoT





“IoT has become the leading technology for digital transformation and is the number one priority for 92 per cent of organizations.”

Inmarsat, “The Future of IoT in Enterprise -- 2017”



“IoT architectures and solutions are critical enablers to achieving innovative and planned business outcomes.”


Gartner, “Internet of Things Primer for 2018”,  
9 January 2018, Nathan Nuttall, Emil  
Berthelsen, Martin Reynolds

# Explosion of IoT on Enterprise Networks






# Explosion of IoT on Enterprise Networks



# Explosion of IoT on Enterprise Networks





CCTV

SMART LIGHTING

ROUTER

ROUTER

CCTV  
COMPROMISED  
DEVICE

SMART TV  
COMPROMISED  
DEVICE

WORK STATION

WORK STATION

WORK STATION

WORK STATION

SMART HVAC

WORK STATION

PRINTER  
COMPROMISED  
DEVICE

LAPTOP

PHONE

PHONE

WIRELESS MOUSE


DIGITAL ASSISTANT

HEADSET

WIRELESS KEYBOARD

MOBILE PHONE

# Office Environment



ACCESS POINT

ULTRASOUND

WORK STATION

TABLET  
COMPROMISED  
DEVICE

BP MONITOR

HEART MONITOR

# Health Care

# ROBOTIC ARM 2

# ROBOTIC ARM 4

COMPROMISED DEVICE  
! Information about the compromised device, including its location and status, is displayed here.

CCTV CCTV

## ROBOTIC ARM 1

## ROBOTIC ARM 3

TABLET TABLET TABLE

RFID SCANNER

# Manufacturing

# Meet The New (Insecure) Endpoint



January 31, 2018

## Autosploit marries Shodan, Metasploit, puts IoT devices at risk



Autosploit, a new tool that basically couples Shodan and Metasploit, makes it easy for even amateurs to hack vulnerable IoT devices.

"As the name might suggest AutoSploit attempts to automate the exploitation of remote hosts," its creator, who goes by the handle "Vector," wrote on Github.

Using the Shodan.io API, the program automatically collects targets and lets users enter platform-specific search queries, for instance, Apache. Based on the search criteria it retrieves a list of




Autosploit automates hacking for amateurs and underscores the need for tighter security around IoT.

# Attacks on Unmanageable Devices are Increasing



Increase in attacks from 2016 to 2017

Symantec ISTR 2018



had a breach or security incident associated with IoT security.

IDC, 2017



of all identified attacks in enterprises will involve unmanageable devices by 2020.


Gartner, 2017



# Can Spread From Device To Device



# What is Your Security Strategy for IoT?



# Eight Security Strategies for Unmanaged Devices in the Enterprise

## 1. Buy devices carefully – look for built-in security



**IoT Inspector**

- detect vulnerabilities in the firmware of IoT devices
- no source code required
- instant results, comprehensive reporting and alerting
- covers a broad range of IoT devices, including IP cameras, routers, printers, and many more
- ISP specific solution for CPE devices available

The background of the slide features a faint cityscape and a network diagram with nodes and lines.


# Eight Security Strategies for Unmanaged Devices in the Enterprise

1. Buy devices carefully – look for built-in security
2. Deploy devices carefully – change default settings



# Eight Security Strategies for Unmanaged Devices in the Enterprise

1. Buy devices carefully – look for built-in security
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3. Use network segmentation – but be aware of its limits



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4. Use encryption wherever possible
5. **Maintain a real-time inventory of everything**



BYOD Devices



Managed Devices



IoT Devices



Off-Network Devices

# Eight Security Strategies for Unmanaged Devices in the Enterprise

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6. Proactively assess risk of every device





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6. Proactively assess risk of every device
7. **Continuously monitor to detect threats**



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7. Continuously monitor to detect threats
8. Have an (automated) plan to contain threats



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Armis  
helps  
here



# THE ARMIS SOLUTION

## Agentless IoT Security Platform



## Agentless IoT Security Platform

### Discover


- Managed and unmanaged
- Wired and wireless
- On and off the network

### Analyze

- Risk and threat quantification
- Behavioral analysis
- Anomaly detection

### Protect

- Remove suspicious devices
- Manually or per policy
- Inform firewall, SIEM, etc.



**NO AGENT / HARDWARE**  
No agent is required on devices for tracking and control. No hardware or sensors required.



**FRICTIONLESS**  
Deploys in minutes. Integrates with existing infrastructure, firewall, and SIEM.




# How Armis Works

SERVICES

INFRASTRUCTURE

ENDPOINTS



- 1 **Discover** and classify all devices – on network, off network, corporate, BYOD, IoT, rogue, Bluetooth, etc.
- 2 **Analyze** device behavior and compare to baseline for similar device types. Assess risk.
- 3 **Protect** by triggering WLC, NAC, switch, or firewall to block risky or attacking devices

# Device Knowledgebase

5M

Unique  
Device  
Profiles



## Device Tracking

- ▶ Device Type
- ▶ Behavior
- ▶ Connections
- ▶ Reputation
- ▶ Version
- ▶ Data-at-Rest
- ▶ History

# 6 EXPLOITS

## Real Stories Behind the Headlines



# Compromised Tablet



## ISSUE – UNAUTHORIZED VIDEO STREAMING

- Every conference room had an tablet to control the video system on the guest network.
- The tablet in one conference room was streaming video and audio
- This represented a leakage of sensitive conversations.

Armis	NAC	Firewall	IPS/UEBA
✓	✗	✗	✗
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Gleaned WiFi traffic</li><li>• Discovered and classified all devices and associated traffic volumes</li><li>• Risk analysis engine identified anomalous traffic with the device</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Inventories devices and controls entry to the network.</li><li>• Does not monitor traffic volumes</li><li>• Not designed to detect anomalous devices. Video traffic seemed “normal”</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Designed to protect the perimeter.</li><li>• Not designed to detect anomalous devices.</li><li>• Data streaming from tablet seemed “normal” to firewall.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• IPS looks for attacks, not for “normal” traffic such as video.</li><li>• UEBA is not designed to detect anomalous devices. Video streaming from tablet seemed “normal” to UEBA.</li></ul>

# Compromised Smart TV



## ISSUE – SMART DEVICE ATTEMPTING TO INFECT OTHER DEVICES

- Boardroom was equipped with a Smart TV that had malware on it.
- Malware on the Smart TV was trying to infect nearby devices via Bluetooth.

Armis	NAC	Firewall	IPS/UEBA
✓	✗	✗	✗
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Monitors Bluetooth &amp; network traffic</li><li>• Correlated traffic and activity to devices and locations.</li><li>• Large amounts of WiFi &amp; Bluetooth traffic detected.</li><li>• TVs were beaconing to infect nearby devices.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The Smart TV was whitelisted on the NAC, so it let the TV onto the network.</li><li>• Post-admission, NAC does not monitor behavior or external wireless connections.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The Smart TV was not sending out anything through the gateway.</li><li>• The FW cannot see external wireless connections from devices.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The Smart TV was not sending out anything over the network.</li><li>• The IPS cannot see external wireless connections from devices</li></ul>

# Compromised Security Camera (& Routers)



## ISSUE – BOTNET ATTACK

Security cameras on the network were compromised, part of a botnet, trying to propagate.

Armis	NAC	Firewall	IPS/UEBA
✓	✗	✗	?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Discovered and classified all devices.</li><li>• Monitored traffic.</li><li>• Risk Analysis Engine saw cameras trying to connect to other cameras &amp; routers via ports 23 and 80.</li><li>• Triggered switches to quarantine the devices.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Inventories devices and controls entry to the network.</li><li>• Does not monitor traffic over time.</li><li>• Not designed to detect anomalous behavior.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Not designed to monitor internal network traffic.</li><li>• Firewalls have difficult time detecting botnet propagation or C&amp;C because it is disguised as peer-to-peer.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• IPS could have discovered cameras if IPS was in the right location and had a behavior signature.</li><li>• UEBA might have discovered the behavior anomaly, if it had the right data.</li></ul>

# Infected Healthcare Device



## ISSUE – SMART DEVICE ATTEMPTING TO INFECT OTHER DEVICES

- MRI machine had an external internet connection for vendor remote support.
- Running Windows XP, unpatched since it would void the warranty.
- Infected with WannaCry and trying to infect other Windows systems via SMB.

Armis	NAC	Firewall	IPS/UEBA
✓	✗	✗	?
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Discovered devices</li><li>• Correlated traffic with each device</li><li>• Risk analysis engine saw anomalous SMBv1 traffic.</li><li>• Trigger sent to NAC to quarantine MRI machine</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Inventories devices and controls entry to the network.</li><li>• Does not detect attacks.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Designed to protect the perimeter.</li><li>• Not designed to monitor internal network traffic.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• UEBA could potentially detect the WannaCry if it was installed in a way that allowed it to see this low level traffic.</li></ul>

# Unauthorized Network Bridge



## ISSUE – PRINTER ALLOWED ANYONE TO CONNECT

A printer that is connected to the wired network has an open hotspot on it, providing access to unauthorized parties.





Armis	NAC	Firewall	IPS/UEBA
✓	✗	✗	✗
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Monitored the airspace.</li><li>• Discovered printer with open hot spot, provided an alert.</li><li>• If there were any actual connections to the printers, Armis would discover those too</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Inventories devices and controls entry to the network.</li><li>• Does not monitor open hotspots or external connections to printers.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Designed to protect the perimeter.</li><li>• Does not monitor open hotspots or connections to those hotspots.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• IPS looks for attack behavior, not for dormant open hotspots.</li><li>• UEBA would not see the hotspot or the external connections.</li></ul>

# Rogue Network Stealing Credential



## ISSUE – THEFT OF NETWORK CREDENTIALS

- A corporate device is connecting to a pineapple that is collecting its Active Directory credentials or hashes

Armis	NAC	Firewall	IPS/UEBA
			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Detects when a corporate device connects to an external network.</li><li>• Detects when credentials or hashes move over unencrypted wireless traffic.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Detects and controls entry to the corp network only.</li><li>• Would not “see” the external network, nor the connections to it.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Designed to protect the perimeter.</li><li>• Would not “see” the external network, nor the connections to it.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Neither IPS nor UEBA would “see” the external network and the connections to it</li></ul>

# THANK YOU

